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Tanks were first used by the Canadian Army in Afghanistan 
in the fall of 2006 during Operation 
Medusa .  S impl i s t i c  c r i t i c i sm 
in public venues focused on the 
argument that tanks were unsuited 
to counterinsurgency operations 
because of the amount of damage 
to the infrastructure they caused 
moving around or through use of the 
vehicles’ weapons. Others viewed the 
deployment of tanks as a sign that the 
coalition was “losing” the war because 
the insurgents had “escalated” to 
conventional operations and, in 
the Maoist schema, victory for the 
insurgents had to be near because 
they supposedly transitioned from 
guerilla to conventional operations. 
Deployment of “conventional” forces 
like tanks to counter this “transition” 
w a s  t h e r e f o r e  p r o b l e m a t i c . 
Comments like “The Soviets used 
tanks and failed, Canada is now 
using tanks, thererfore Canada will 
fail” made the rounds. The presence 
of Canadian tanks in Afghanistan 
assumed political as well as practical 
dimensions. 
 By 2008, these arguments had all 
but died away in the mediasphere 
and the punditocracy. Tanks were 
no longer a novelty in the Canadian 
area of operations. The Leopard 
C-2s of 2006 were replaced by 
Leopard 2A6Ms by the summer of 
2007, though many Leo C2s stayed 
on to push anti-mine and anti-
IED implements that could not 
be mounted on the new vehicles 
because of their armour’s modular 
construction.1 What became evident 
to Canadian battlegroup commanders 
very quickly once they got on the 
ground was the diversity of the 
terrain in Kandahar province. That 
diversity dictated that a variety of 
forces be employed to meet coalition 
objectives. In this case, tanks would be 
unsuited for operations in Kandahar 
City, or say, the mountainous Maruf 
or upper Shah Wali Kot districts. 
In the open terrain in Maywand, 
however, there were advantages 
to using armour. Tanks could be 
used even in the built up green belts 
around the city. The Howz-e Madad 
incursion of June 20072 was one 
example. There was also Arghandab 
1 in October-November 2007 during 
which a troop of Leopard C-2s 
covered open high ground to screen 
a battalion-sized assault into a built 
up area – right out of Canadian Cold 
War FIBUA3 doctrine. Armoured 
columns were used to resupply 
isolated strongpoints like Mushan.4 
 Operation Timus Preem, led by 
Lieutenant-Colonel David Corbould 
and conducted by the 2 Princess 
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry 
(PPCLI) Battlegroup in August was a 
mechanized assault involving nearly 
two battalion-sized units of Canadian 
and Afghan forces, with armour 
leading the main effort. Operation 
Timus Preem resembled Operation 
Totalize, or Tractable, the Canadian 
offensives in Normandy in 1944,on a 
smaller scale: the terrain is extremely 
restricted and similar to bocage 
in Normandy and the operation 
involved the use of armoured 
breaching columns.5
The Origins of the Operation
The 2008 iteration of Joint Task Force Afghanistan,  led by 
Brigadier-General Denis Thompson, 
planned to create a “stability box” in 
eastern Zharey District in Kandahar 
province. The idea was to select a key 
area and apply serious resources to 
it. Operations in the box would, in 
theory, dislocate insurgents, convince 
the “fence sitters” to support the 
government, deny the enemy the 
ability to influence the population 
in the box, and prepare the area for 
a high-profile development projects. 
 Stability Box Juno was established 
in June-July 2008. It encompassed 
Operation Timus Preem, led by 
Lieutenant-Colonel David Corbould 
and conducted by the 2 Princess 
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry 
(PPCLI) Battlegroup in August 2008 was 
a mechanized assault involving nearly 
two battalion-sized units of Canadian 
and Afghan forces, with armour leading 
the main effort. Overall, Operation Timus 
Preem was a successful operation. 
It forced the enemy to re-organize 
their command structure and replace 
leaders. It wiped out their “forward” IED 
production capacity and transit base to 
the Sangeray area and the operation 
also most likely took out some of the 
people involved in killing the three 
Canadian engineers on the eve of the 
operation.
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Route Summit from Highway 1 down 
to Bazaar-e Panjwayi in Panjwayi 
district. Stability Box Juno was also 
supposed to give focus to Canadian 
development efforts: CIDA, DFAIT, 
and other government departments 
now had a specific area in which to 
establish a joint interagency team to 
work together on a series of projects. 
The intention was that a second 
stability box would be established 
in Panjwayi district once Juno was 
up and running. Juno was limited to 
part of Zharey district because there 
were not enough resources to project 
Afghan governance and security 
throughout the whole district.
 Several factors militated against 
the effective operation of Juno. The 
primary reason was the Sarposa 
prison break and the subsequent 
diversion of forces to conduct the 
Arghandab 2 operation in June 2008. 
The secondary factor was the ongoing 
demand for the 2 PPCLI Battlegroup’s 
infantry companies to occupy legacy 
tactical infrastructure positions along 
Route Fosters. As usual, the dearth 
of Afghan police and the continuing 
build-up of the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) and its occasional 
diversion to Helmand province 
were impediments to establishing 
security in the stability box, as were 
the ongoing problems between 
the Afghans as to who constituted 
legitimate governance in the two 
districts. The Canadian interagency 
piece was still evolving. If Juno was 
supposed to be a showcase, there was 
not much under the glass by the high 
summer of 2008. That did not prevent 
continuing efforts to jump start the 
process, however, and consequent 
enemy disruptive activities. 
 Indeed, a series of operations 
along Highway 1 near Sanjeray 
assumed priority status. The enemy 
had conducted a series of high-
profile IED attacks on the highway 
which threatened to cut off this vital 
east-west commercial and logistic 
route. Operation Asp-e-Janoubi, 
(aka “Ass Pain Janoubi” to the staff) 
was a complex operation involving 
the transport of a huge turbine 
from Kandahar Air Field all the 
way to the Kajaki Dam in Helmand 
province. The Kajaki Dam was the 
key hydroelectric producer in the 
region and, after years of neglect, it 
was failing. The logistics of moving 
such a piece of equipment over such 
a distance and then protecting it from 
enemy action were immense. Keep in 
mind that the information operations 
effects of failure for Asp-e-Janoubi 
were potentially catastrophic and 
overshadowed Canadian operations 
in Kandahar Province. 
 Over the course of the summer, 
the battlegroup planning staff, led 
by Major Jay Adair, developed a 
series of plans designed to “protect 
and enable” Stability Box Juno. 
ISTAR resources were focused on 
the area west of Juno, specifically 
on a suspected enemy command 
node in a large compound complex 
dubbed Objective Weasel. This node 
had some relationship to the IED 
cells operating along Highway 1 but 
it also was connected to the rocket 
attacks on Forward Operating Base 
(FOB) Mas’um Ghar. Another cell 
and command and control node from 
Nahlgam to the southwest operated 
against Afghan National Police in 
western Zharey, while another cell 
harrassed Strong Point Mushan over 
in western Panjwayi district. 
 Objective Weasel was a physical 
location but the pattern of activity 
in that area varied. Enemy leaders 
came and went, including the 
notorious Jabber Agha,6 and there 
were an estimated 40 to 50 enemy 
fighters in the vicinity. Zangabad 
boasted another 40 or 50 fighters, as 
did Nahlgam. A number of enemy 
IED specialists, based in Sia Choy 
and Nahlgam, used Weasel as a 
Above: Brigadier-General Denis Thompson (left) was the commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan. Right: Lieutenant-
Colonel David Corbould was the commanding officer of the 2 Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battlegroup.
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transit point when they moved to 
and from Sanjeray. Adair and his 
staff discussed the possibility that 
Objective Weasel also served as part 
of the enemy’s early warning system. 
If coalition forces started to move 
west from Juno, the forces around 
Weasel would conduct some form of 
covering force fight until the “deep” 
forces in western Zharey could be 
mobilized and deployed. 
 The planners struggled to 
identify objectives. There were not 
enough Afghan security forces to 
establish an enduring presence in the 
area cleared by coalition forces, so 
extending Stability Box Juno was out. 
However, a major operation against 
these enemy forward positions could 
accomplish multiple objectives. First, 
it would probably interfere with 
enemy operations in Sanjeray and his 
IED operations in Highway1. That 
would draw off heat from the turbine 
move. Second, 3 Royal Canadian 
Regiment (RCR) Battlegroup was 
arriving in September to affect a 
relief in place (or RIP) with 2 PPCLI 
Battlegroup. One lesson from 2006 
was that the enemy would use every 
means available to exploit the lack 
of acclimatization of the incoming 
forces. A major operation that put 
the enemy back on his heels right 
before the RIP would positively 
contribute to the process and protect 
the incoming forces. Finally, an 
operation like this would force the 
enemy away from Juno and give the 
interagency and governance process 
some breathing room.
 This was only a contingency 
operation as of 8 August and there was 
no inevitability about its execution. 
Were there enough forces available to 
mount it if Task Force Kandahar said 
“go”? This was a serious problem. A 
combination of the leave plan, the 
protection of tactical infrastructure, 
a quick reaction force task, and the 
siphoning off of infantry platoons 
to guard bridges in northeastern 
Kandahar province near Zabol 
meant that 2 PPCLI battlegroup 
had less than 50 percent of its forces 
available for planning purposes. The 
planners had four infantry platoons 
in LAV-IIIs; two tank troops; a 
Coyote  recce troop; two engineer 
platoons; and the M-777 artillery 
battery available. For command and 
control, there were two infantry 
company headquarters, a tank 
squadron headquarters and the recce 
squadron headquarters. This was not 
going to be enough. The planners 
looked at Afghan National Security 
Force availability. After consultation 
with the Canadian Operational 
Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), 
there was the possibility that an ANA 
company and an ANA platoon, with 
their Canadian mentors, could be 
cut loose for the operation. Perhaps 
more. Perhaps not. 
 Between 8 August and 16 August, 
the concept of operations (CONOP) 
continued to evolve. In a general 
sense, there would be a main effort 
in the centre against the western area 
of Pashmul, with two supporting 
attacks, one to the northwest down 
from Highway 1, and the other 
moving east to west south of Pashmul. 
In the CONOP plan, planners used 
phase lines named after characters 
from the movie “Transformers,” a 
DVD that was popular among the 
armoured soldiers. The CONOP was 
thus formally designated Operation 
Timus Preem. Regional Command 
(South), which consisted of older 
staff officers not au fait with popular 
culture, asked what Timus Preem 
was – Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould 
told everybody it meant “lawn 
mower” in Pashto. 
 On 16 August, Operation Timus 
Preem was formalized by Task 
Force Kandahar. Coincidentally, 
there was more and more ISTAR 
reports of enemy leadership in and 
around Objective Weasel, including 
Jabber Agha and two other senior 
commanders. Structurally, the plan 
remained the same: a main effort 
directed against three successive 
objective areas, with two disrupt 
operations in the flanks, and aerial 
screens provided by US Army 
OH-58D helicopters and unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV). The only 
real debate at this point was how 
to hit Objective Weasel, with what, 
and when. One planner wanted to 
use a particular missile system, but 
that was not available so the idea 
of unloading a B-1B bomber onto 
Weasel at the start of the operation 
emerged. Weasel’s elimination at 
the start of the operation would, in 
theory, have a significant disruptive 
effect.
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FOB Mas’um Ghar: 
“B” Squadron, Lord 
Strathcona’s Horse
Canadian operations in eastern Zharey district had evolved 
significantly over the course of three 
years. During the summer operations 
in 2006, Task Force Orion relied on 
deception, night operations, and 
stealth to infiltrate the Pashmul 
a r e a  w i t h  L A V - I I I - m o u n t e d 
infantry. The mass deployment of 
improvised explosive devices altered 
that approach and in 2007 2 RCR 
Battlegroup conducted daytime 
tank-led mechanized incursions 
into the district coupled with early 
morning dismounted infantry 
insertions. In 2008, 2 PPCLI mounted 
several company-sized dismounted 
incursions supported by tanks. 
Operation Timus Preem would be the 
first battlegroup-sized operation of 
the 2008 rotation where the tanks led. 
 The three designated objective 
areas in Operation Timus Preem 
require some explanation. Each 
objective area was a collection of 
compound complexes, almost like 
islands. Each cluster of complexes 
was surrounded by grape growing 
trenches, drying huts, tree-covered 
irrigation systems, and because it was 
August, lush and dense vegetation 
(corn and marijuana, mostly). The 
only roads into and out of these areas 
were one-lane unpaved routes with 
multiple irregular twists and turns 
and innumerable culverts. That is, 
theses routes were perfect for IED 
emplacement. 
 The only way to avoid IED 
attack and subsequent canalization 
and delay was, in effect, to create 
unpredictably new roads as the 
operation progressed. This is where 
the armoured vehicles came in. 
The Badger Armoured Engineer 
Vehicle or AEV employed at this 
time was a Leopard 1 hull with 
engineering modifications, including 
a durable dozer blade. The armoured 
engineers were also experimenting 
with fascines carried not only on 
the AEV but by armoured trucks, 
the Mercedes AHSVS, as the Beaver 
AVLB vehicle was too unwieldy to 
use in the Zharey environment. The 
AEV boom or any vehicle crane could 
lift facines off of the truck’s cargo area 
and emplace it. Then there were the 
older Leopard C-1s equipped with 
dozer blades. 
 “B” Squadron, led by Major 
Chris Adams and Squadron Sergeant 
Major Tony Batty, experimented with 
these and other measures throughout 
their tour. They built on tactical 
ideas that their predecessors used in 
previous rotations, particularly the 
employment (and recovery) of tanks 
in mobility restricted environments. 
The vehicles themselves were fine-
tuned as much as possible by Tango 
Maintenance at FOB Mas’um Ghar. 
“B” Squadron’s proficiency level 
was at its peak in August 2008 and it 
would all contribute to the success of 
Operation Timus Preem. 
 In terms of  structure,  “B” 
Squadron had three troops, each 
consisting of a mix of vehicles. As 
A Canadian Forces Leopard 1C2 Main 
Battle Tank (left)  sits side-by-side 
with its newly-acquired cousin, the 
Leopard 2A6M.
Badger Armoured Engineering Vehicles 
carried improvised fascines that were 
deployed via the bucket boom during 
the operation.
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a rule, there were four Leopard 2 
A6Ms, plus one or two Leopard 
C-2s equipped with either anti-mine 
plows, rollers, or dozer blades in 
each troop. The make up of each 
troop depended on the mission type 
– River Run, incursion, or Quick 
Reaction Force. There was also a 
mechanized infantry platoon on 
rotation from one of the 2 PPCLI 
companies, an artillery FOO and 
his LAV-III, a troop of armoured 
combat engineers with AEVs, an 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal team, 
plus armoured recovery vehicle 
assets and armoured ambulances. 
The Leopard 2 A6Ms with their 
120 mm smoothbore guns were 
capable of firing canister or HEAT 
rounds. The “M” on the designation 
stood for “mine resistant” as the 
Canadian vehicles had a variety of 
modifications designed to mitigate 
the effects of IED and mine strikes. 
 At the same time “B” Squadron 
was responsible for supporting 
development efforts in the Panjwayi 
and Zharey districts. This took many 
forms but usually meant attempts 
to coordinate efforts between the 
Canadian government departments, 
the Provincial Reconstruction Team, 
the Operational Mentor and Liaison 
team, the Police OMLT, and the 
Afghan security and governance 
people. “B” Squadron staff referred 
to themselves as the “Panjwayi 
East Combined Operations Centre” 
or the home of the “Whole of 
Panjwayi Programme for Enhanced 
Reconstruction.” “B” Squadron also 
handled FOB MSG security, which 
included counter-rocket operations. 
Leopard 2s emplaced in overwatch 
positions regularly engaged Taliban 
rocket teams at night in Operations 
Box Elton as they prepared to fire at 
the FOB.7
 FOB MSG was also home to the 
Operational Mentor and Liaison 
Team supporting 1st Kandak, 1/205 
Brigade of the Afghan National 
Army. Led by Major Dave Proctor, 
the OMLT had its headquarters 
and support facilities co-located 
but not under the command of “B” 
Squadron. There was also a Combat 
Service Support detachment led by 
Lieutenant Alison Lucas. The CSS 
detachment forward, consisting 
of vehicle techs, electro-optical 
equipment techs, weapons techs, 
and supply techs were responsible 
for non-tank maintenance and 
supply distribution at the FOB. 
The detachment had tracked light 
armoured vehicle (TLAV) personnel 
carriers, an armoured heavy support 
vehicle wrecker (AHSVS), a heavy 
logistics vehicle wheeled (HLVW) 
with a crane, and heavy equipment 
(i.e., vehicle) transporters (HET). 
Importantly in this environment, 
the detachment had the ability to 
deploy a fire control system repair 
team, under armour, into the field. 
Tango Maintenance was a separate 
organization and included the 
Leopard 1 and -2 Armoured Recovery 
Vehicles. 
The Enemy Draws First Blood
At 0730 hours on 19 August the shock wave from an explosion 
rocked FOB MSG.  The FOB’s 
occupants initially thought a rocket 
had hit the camp, but in time the 
crews from the Quick Reaction 
Force, consisting of Leopard 1 and 
Leopard 2s, plus an ARV and Bison 
ambulance, moved quickly to their 
vehicles and started up. The Tactical 
Operations Centre staff was trying to 
ascertain what happened. It turned 
out that an enemy suicide bomber 
attacked a Canadian-mentored 
Afghan national police patrol on the 
Bazaar-e Panjwayi-Kandahar City 
Ph
ot
o 
by
 a
ut
ho
r
An example of the complex terrain encountered in Zharey 
District during Op Timus Preem. This is a collection of grape 
drying huts surrounded by vineyard trenches that are four to 
five feet deep and choked with vegetation.
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road. One interpreter was killed and 
a Canadian Police-OMLT mentor 
wounded. A local national child 
was also wounded and a medical 
evacuation chopper was called in. 
 This did not stop planning for 
Operation Timus Preem. Captain 
Edgetar Manoucheri, the battle 
captain and the “B” Squadron staff 
fine-tuned their part of the plan. A 
confirmatory drill held later that day 
revealed that “C” Company, 2 PPCLI, 
plus “B” Squadron would handle 
the main effort. The northwestern 
supporting effort would be done by 
the OMLT with two ANA companies, 
while “B” Company and an ANA 
company would handle the southern 
supporting effort. Knowing full well 
that the enemy kept close observation 
on FOB MSG, Major Adams pre-
positioned his vehicles inside the FOB 
as he normally would for a River Run 
down to Strong Point Mushan so that 
the enemy would think the upcoming 
operations was directed west, not 
north. Hopefully the enemy would 
also re-position his forces which in 
turn would be detected by ISTAR 
resources – and then other coalition 
resources could be directed from 
higher headquarters to interfere with 
the enemy’s activities. 
 Enemy forces in and around 
the objective areas were estimated 
to be around 325 fighters, of which 
100 were assessed to be skilled. 
They knew how to exploit cover 
to protect themselves from ISTAR 
assets and were well versed in how 
to exploit the limitations on the 
Canadian forces imposed by NATO 
rules of engagement. Enemy morale, 
however, was not high and there 
was some internal debate between 
the Zahrey-based commanders as 
to the future direction of operations. 
In terms of leadership, Jabber Agha 
was estimated to be around Pashmul 
planning more suicide bomber 
and IED attacks, while Khaliq and 
Razaq, two of the Zharey district 
commanders, had been seen near 
Objective Weasel. 
 Once Operation Timus Preem 
was detected, the staff anticipated 
that the enemy would use his early 
warning system to determine what 
axis of advance the coalition forces 
were using, and then lay multiple 
IEDs to delay the Canadians and 
Afghans while reinforcements were 
brought in from the west, married 
up with their weapons caches, and 
then deployed to fighting positions. 
The dissenting opinion was that the 
enemy would drop their weapons 
and walk away to the west and not 
engage. Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould 
believed that in either case there 
would be a significant disruptive 
effect on enemy operations in eastern 
Zharey and this would meet the 
operation’s objectives. 
 The main effort, consisting of “B” 
Squadron and “C” Company, was to 
conduct a rapid breach and isolate 
each objective area with a “ring of 
steel.” The tanks and infantry were 
divided up into Breach Teams, BT-1 
and BT-2: 
BT-1:
“B” Squadron HQ (2 X Leopard 2)
“C” Company HQ (1 X LAV-III)
SLAYER (2 X LAV-III  with 
forward observation officer 
(FOO)/forward air controller 
(FAC)/JTAC)
1 Troop (4 X Leopard 2, 2 X 
Leopard 1)
Badger Armoured Engineer 
Vehicle
Leopard 2 Armoured Recovery 
Vehicle
Fuel truck (AHVSS)
Ammo truck (AHVSS)
Fascine truck (AHVSS)
1 X infantry platoon in LAV-III
BT-2:
3 Troop (4 X Leopard 2, 2 X 
Leopard 1)
Badger Armoured Engineer 
Vehicle
Leopard 2 Armoured Recovery 
Vehicle
1 X Leo 2 detached from “B” 
Squadron HQ for command and 
control
1 X infantry platoon in LAV-III
Four M-777 155mm guns and eight 
81 mm mortars on call.
 The ANA, the OMLT mentors, 
and ANP with Canadian Engineer 
Exploitation Teams would then 
sweep the compounds and exploit 
any material or personnel found. 
The force would then move to the 
next objective and do the same 
thing. Any defensive works would 
be destroyed through demolition. 
Aerial overwatch would observe any 
“squirters” and track them. There 
were three objective areas for the 
operation, which was estimated to 
A Leopard 2 A6M advances through a field on day one of Op Timus Preem. The 
decision to avoid existing roads by the advancing forces resulted in no IED 
strikes during the operation.
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take three days. Of note, Operation 
Timus Preem would also have 
psychological operations (PSYOPS) 
and civil-military cooperation 
(CIMIC) detachments in support of 
the effort. 
 While preparations for Operation 
Timus Preem continued, the Red 
Phone in the “B” Squadron tactical 
operations centre rang to the theme 
from the movie “In Like Flint.” 
A massive explosion occurred on 
Highway 1 around 1040 hours on 20 
August. A Canadian engineer recce 
party supporting Operation Aspy 
Janoubi consisting of an engineer 
section and recce platoon from 2 
PPCLI were subjected to IED attack. 
As the quick reaction force rolled out 
the gate, ISTAR reports warned that 
an enemy commander in western 
Zahrey was preparing to send forces 
to attack those responding to assist. 
 T h e  d r a m a  c o n t i n u e d  a l l 
morning. The stricken vehicle had 
flipped over, the turret wrenched off 
and the surviving crew was trapped 
inside. Then the vehicle started to 
burn. An armoured recovery vehicle 
and a Bison ambulance approached 
the site to right the wreck and extract 
the crew, but there was no protected 
fire-fighting capability to stop the fire. 
Then ISTAR reports noted that six 
to ten insurgents with a significant 
enemy leader were nearing the blast 
site. Medical evacuation helicopters 
were called in, but there were now 
concerns that the enemy might 
have laid IEDs on the nearest open 
space – the American task force 
wanted engineers to clear a helicopter 
landing site before they would go in. 
 There were an estimated four 
casualties, but their status was in 
some doubt. One Canadian was 
outside of the vehicle but three were 
still inside. Then ammunition in the 
stricken LAV started to cook off, 
which slowed the recovery team’s 
efforts. Back in the battlegroup 
tactical operations centre, the JTAC 
and intelligence staff were trying to 
track the inbound enemy commander 
with the intent of using a MQ-1 
Predator or MQ-9 Reaper to kill 
him. Artillery could not be used 
because of a rules of engagement 
issue. Fortunately for him, when the 
Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, Princess 
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry 
advance along a track during OP Timis 
Preem.
Ph
ot
o 
by
 a
ut
ho
r
CF
JI
C 
AR
2
0
0
8
-K
07
3
-9
8
M
ap
 d
ra
w
n 
by
 M
ik
e 
B
ec
ht
ho
ld
 ©
2
01
0
Maloney - The Mechs.indd   63 9/28/2010   1:10:02 PM
7
: The Mechs Operation Timus Preem, August 2008
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
64
UAVs became available he could not 
be engaged because of another rules 
of engagement issue. 
 The staff discovered that there 
was in fact a firefighter vehicle 
available but they had not been 
told it existed – it was to suppress 
aircraft fires at the landing zone and 
“belonged” to another organization 
at Kandahar Air Field. Major Steve 
Davies from the OMLT volunteered 
to lead this virtually unarmoured 
recovery “package” through Zharey 
district to the strike site. This included 
the firefighting vehicle, a dump 
truck (to fill in the crater) and a low-
bed heavy equipment transporter, 
escorted by OMLT RG-31 patrol 
vehicles. Another threat warning 
from ISTAR reports came in – the 
enemy was deploying a mortar team 
to attack the IED strike site. Resources 
were deployed to look for it. The 
flat screen television in the tactical 
operations centre, set to a news 
channel, surreally announced that 
Christina Applegate was diagnosed 
with breast cancer. It was quickly 
shut off. The mortar team, it turned 
out, directed its efforts at Strong Point 
Mushan, not the strike site. After two 
mortar rounds landed near the strong 
point, M-777 guns were called in to 
suppress the weapon. 
 Tragically, the quick reaction 
force reported in that there were three 
Canadian dead and one wounded.8 
The belief at FOB Mas’um Ghar 
was that Commander Canadian 
Expeditionary Force Command, 
who was in theatre at this time, 
might put a hold on Operation 
Timus Preem, anticipating domestic 
political sensitivities. This proved 
to be unfounded, however, and the 
enraged Canadians made their final 
preparations late into the night of 20 
August. The crew of T-23, a Leopard 
C-2, spray-painted the visage of a 
grim reaper and his scythe onto the 
dozer blade of their vehicle.
Day 1 – 21 August
At 0415 the battlegroup’s TAC forward at FOB MSG was fully 
manned and at 0426 hours, a pair of 
US Army AH-64 Apaches arrived 
on station and checked in. Inside 
FOB MSG, long lines of armoured 
vehicles from the breach teams with 
their engines off sat in the dark, 
their crews cupping their cigarettes. 
Foot patrols swept suspected rocket 
launch locations sites outside the 
camp. Operation Timus Preem was 
cocked and ready, awaiting clearence 
to engage Objective Weasel. ISTAR 
assets were now closely observing 
the site, checking the pattern of life. 
When a control link failed between 
an allied ground station and an 
allied UAV that was operating on 
the flanks, a Canadian Sperwer was 
brought on station to check a “deep” 
target in western Zharey district. 
Nothing. No movement. ISTAR 
reports – enemy quiet. 
  The breach team columns roared 
to life at 0445 hours and headed out 
the gate, down the road and into 
the Arghandab River wadi. Instead 
of turning left and heading down 
the river to Mushan, the Badgers, 
Operation Timus Preem was initiated by nine bombs dropped by a B-1B 
on Objective Weasel, an enemy command and control compound.
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Leopards, and LAVs proceded north 
on Route Summit. No contact. The sun 
was just starting to come up at 0515 
hours revealing dusty mountains in 
the distance. ISTAR resources still 
had observation on Objective Weasel, 
waiting for the enemy commanders 
to arrive. Breach Team 1 reported in 
– the first breach is in. Unfortunately 
a traffic jam developed on Route 
Summit which slowed down the 
second breach team’s movements. 
The ANA and the OMLT moved on to 
their objectives south of the breaches. 
 At  this  point  the enemy’s 
early warning network was not 
reporting anything using any means, 
nor was the enemy activating 
reinforcements. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Corbould believed that the presence 
of the AH-64s was deterring enemy 
movement, so he ordered them to 
orbit elsewhere for the time being, 
hoping the enemy would come out 
and play. By 0605 hours, there was 
still no detected enemy movement. 
 The Badgers, with their blades 
down, turned west off of Route 
Summit ploughing tracks across 
the grape trenches and smashing 
through high mud walls. Then a 
Leo 1 with a dozer blade followed 
behind, ploughing four or five small 
paths off the main track. The Leo 1 
dozer then backed up and the paths 
were occupied by the Leopard 2s. 
This “herring bone” formation was 
repeated as necessary, with the 
infantry following in LAV-IIIs. 
The tracks allowed the columns to 
completely bypass the roads which 
were assumed to have pre-positioned 
IEDs on them. 
  At 0634 hours, the enemy 
finally reacted and their whole 
communications system erupted in 
an aural blur. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Corbould could not wait any longer 
and decided to engage Objective 
Weasel. The battlegroup tactical 
headquarters chatted with a B-1B 
that was orbiting high overhead. 
The staff filed out of the bunker 
with their binoculars to watch. 
A cloud of smoke and dust billows from the target of a Canadian M-777 155 mm gun 
which fired a mission to discourage enemy withdrawal from an objective compound.
LAV-III and RG-31 with mounted infantry advance along a lane plowed through the 
grape fields.
A dozer-equipped Leopard 1 moves up to plow run-ups for the LAV-IIIs. The lack of 
air conditioning in the older vehicles resulted in the manufacture of heat reflective 
umbrellas which significantly reduced temperatures for the crews.
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It was now a dusty, hot dawn. 
Object ive  Weasel  was  bare ly 
perceptible from FOB MSG. A loud 
“CRUUUMMMMPPPP!”, the shock 
wave of nine guided bomb units 
smashing into Weasel, hit the FOB 
and a plume of black smoke could be 
seen several kilometers away.
 “B” Squadron got the first contact 
at 0637 hours. A volly of rocket-
propelled grenade and small arms 
fire was directed at the lead vehicles. 
Leopards from 2 Troop returned 
fire. Then a US police mentoring 
team triggered some form of anti-
personnel device as the vehicle 
manoeuvred, wounding one of its 
crew. By 0654 hours there were 
several contacts underway – the 
OMLT and their Afghan troops were 
engaged in two locations on the two 
supporting efforts; “B” Squadron 
was shooting it out with insurgents 
on their axis of advance, and “C” 
Company, moving in behind “B” 
Squadron, was engaging enemy in 
a compound. ISTAR detected four, 
maybe more, enemy moving to a 
compound to engage “C” Company, 
but the FOO called in a fire mission 
and 155 mm rounds crashed onto the 
compound they occupied. A second 
fire misson was called in to take out a 
similar attempt by the enemy to move 
up and engage. 
 The first objective was designated 
Mike. It consisted of numerous 
compound complexes and was 
separated into Mike 1 through Mike 3. 
Breach Team 1 ploughed its way to 
Mike, and then ploughed a “ring 
road” around Mike. The dozer tanks 
then ploughed run ups and paths off 
of the “ring road.” Leopard 2s and 
LAV-IIIs then moved in. The idea was 
to isolate Mike by having 360 degree 
observation and fire around the whole 
area – anything trying to get into 
Mike would be engaged, as would 
anything trying to get out. Once the 
360 degree cut off was established, 
the Afghans, their OMLT mentors, 
plus the Engineer Exploitation Team 
Top: Pre-positioned chambers for improvised explosive devices were discovered 
along the roads. Combat engineers cleared the roads behind the advance forces 
to permit resupply.
Middle: Soldiers from the Afghan National Army and their Canadian Army operational 
mentors advance to search a compound complex. The ANA were responsible for all 
compound searches, while the Canadians handled cut-off security.
Bottom: A Leopard 2 in a cut-off position.
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moved in to sweep the Mike 1, 2, and 
3 compound complexes. PSYOPS and 
CIMIC teams assisted as required if 
there were civilians in the area. 
 S e a r c h i n g  o n e  co m p o u n d 
complex, let alone three, was arduous. 
Wearing body armour and carrying 
ammunition and water in the nearly 
45 degree heat was taxing for all 
involved. Indeed, it took all day to 
sweep and clear Mike.
 ISTAR detected enemy movement 
near Kilo as the second wave of ANA 
deployed. Over in Panjwayi, two 
IEDs exploded on Route Fosters, 
but apparently not against coalition 
targets. As they had in the past, 
the enemy was trying to distract 
attention from the main effort over 
in Zharey. 
 Around 0800 hours, an OMLT 
vehicle observed and engaged enemy 
moving around Objective Echo. 
The two AH-64s were called in and 
unleashed their rocket pods on them. 
Another unit, 3 Platoon, identified 
enemy movement south of Mike 
and started to engage. The JTAC 
accompanying Breach Team 1 cleared 
in a Harrier which dropped a guided 
bomb unit, obliterating the enemy in 
the open. The ANA and the OMLT 
worked quickly in the Kilo complexes 
– they declared the first three clear by 
0950 hours. 
 In an effort to speed up the 
opening of resupply and casualty 
extraction routes, combat engineers 
using counter-IED equipment cleared 
the roads parallel to the breaches. 
They found numerous pre-positioned 
IED components, including a massive 
culvert bomb. They also discovered 
multiple fighting positions with 
interlocking field of fire. These were 
destroyed with explosives. In a 
disturbing development, an OH-58D 
from the Banshees saw a suspected 
IED from the air on Route Summit. 
Engineers were diverted to examine 
the site and remove the device. Then 
a vehicle from the American Police 
Mentoring Team accompanying 
the Afghan police in Objective Kilo 
struck an IED. It was a mobility kill 
with no casualties. 
 The Afghans and the OMLT 
continued to get contact, particularly 
in and around Objective Kilo to 
the west. An ANA platoon had a 
short but sharp engagement with 
a small group of insurgents who 
appeared to be trying to infiltrate 
into Objective Mike. Another small 
group was driven off by the cut-off 
force surrounding Mike. Even the 
battlegroup tactical air controller 
got involved at 1115 hours, a 9’r 
TAC LAV-III observed and engaged 
six enemy fighters with rocket-
propelled grenade launchers trying 
to skirt Mike to the south and get 
in behind the cut-off force from the 
east. Heavy-calibre weapons were 
fired from the RG-31s and LAV-IIIs, 
and an AH-64 came in to finish off 
what was left with 25 mm cannon 
fire. The backpacks these insurgents 
were carrying went up in a series of 
secondary explosions. The AH-64s 
were then diverted to drop a Hellfire 
on a grape hut into which several 
insurgents were seen to flee. Another 
estimated four insurgents were taken 
out in that strike. By 1155 hours, 
Breach Team 1 remained in position 
around Objective Mike, while Breach 
Team 2 passed through Mike heading 
south.
 N o r m a l l y ,  t h e  e n e m y 
commanders in Zharey would 
be assembling and deploying 
reinforcements from communities 
in the west. This was not happening 
to the extent that some hoped. Was 
the enemy discombobulated by the 
novelty of the operation? Or was the 
enemy choosing not to react and then 
flow back in later? Were there other 
reasons? Was this slow response an 
effect of the strike on Weasel? It was 
not clear. What was clear was that 
ISTAR reports indicated the enemy 
commanders were having problems 
activating a single suicide bomber 
to infiltrate Mike, let alone mount 
a coordinated assault on the Timus 
Preem forces. 
 By 1215 hours, the ANA and 
OMLT were consolidating Objective 
Kilo, and then found two IEDs. 
Objective Mike was being swept, but 
was not yet clear. The initial battle 
damage assessment of Objective 
Weasel was that 90 percent of the 
target was damaged. ISTAR reports 
suggested but did not confirm that 
there were 40 enemy killed in the 
strike, including some medium-value 
leadership targets. 
 Breach Team 2 moved south of 
Mike and started clearing leaguer 
areas for the assault force in the fields. 
The Badgers and dozers cleared three 
parallel lanes for each assault force. 
While this was happening, 4 Platoon 
got a contact inside Mike: three 
insurgents were positively identified 
and engaged in the late afternoon. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould’s 
assessment of the situation in the 
waning hours of 21 August was 
that the breaching operations were 
much slower than anticipated, the 
operations on Objective Kilo were 
a successful block with positive 
effects, and the deep strikes were 
successful at engaging reinforcing 
fighters. He now had a decision: 
should the force go after Objective 
Golf or Objective Whiskey? It was 
unfortunate that the coalition did 
not have the resources permanently 
to garrison Objectives Mike, Golf, 
and Whiskey. The battlegroup had 
temporarily expanded the “security 
bubble” west of Stability Box Juno. It 
was too bad that this situation could 
not be exploited. 
 The CIMIC teams were now 
reporting that there were some 
annoyed farmers. It could take 
years, even decades in some cases, 
to grow the huge grape vines in these 
trenches. Chunks of these fields were 
being obliterated by the dozer blades. 
The message from the battlegroup 
was less than conciliatory: “If you 
told us where the IEDs were on the 
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roads, we wouldn’t have to make our 
own,” they were told. That is, you 
locals are “fence sitting.” You want 
us to stop, come off the fence. 
 At 1830 hours, 120 mm and 
25 mm fire erupted west of Mike, 
and artillery started to land on 
targets. There were contacts all over 
the place and it appeared as though 
small groups were trying to infiltrate 
at dusk. They were unsuccessful. By 
1845 hours, both breach teams were 
lined up in their lanes south of Mike 
when cries of “Stand To!” were called 
out. The lead tanks on the lanes then 
engaged targets 300 to 400 metres to 
the south in the direction of Objective 
Golf. Three groups of fighting age 
males pretending to be labourers 
during the day recovered cached 
weapons at night and advanced on 
the leaguer. They were all taken out. 
 ISTAR resources reported that 
the enemy was bringing in an “82” in 
a vehicle. Was it a mortar or a recoil-
less rifle? Nobody was sure. “Crash 
harbour” was not an option given 
the restrictive terrain. Four civilian 
vehicles and some 20 personnel were 
spotted moving in from the south 
west, but weapons were not evident. 
Various systems continued to track 
them. Then coalition forces over in 
Objective Kilo started tracking night 
movements, up to 50 personnel. 
ISTAR picked up that a significant 
enemy commander from Zharey was 
present, but the conditions were not 
right to engage. It may have been a 
funeral.
 It was a cool night as the crews 
bedded down behind their vehicles. 
Captain Tom Neil and his PSYOPS 
crews in their RG-31s turned on their 
loudspeakers. Interpreters read out 
messages and letters to the Taliban 
in Pashto, trying to convince them 
to quit the fighting: “Taliban, if you 
want to use the children for suicide 
attacks that is not good. They are 
innocents. If you are ready to fight 
grown-ups, we are here.” “Taliban, 
if you drank your mother’s milk, 
then come out to the fighting place 
and fight us. If you don’t, then you 
are a bastard.” A Scan Eagle MUAV 
buzzed the leaguer, and orbited the 
perimeter.
Day 2 – 22 August
The troops  put  away their sleeping gear after they awoke 
in the morning cool. Lieutenant-
Colonel Corbould decided to move 
on objectives Whiskey and Golf 
simultaneously. His decision was 
in part based on overnight ISTAR 
reports. The enemy, apparently, 
believed that this incursion was 
payback for the three Canadians 
killed on Highway 1. They also 
were surprised that the force did 
not pull out at noon and remained 
in the field. They were confused as 
to what the next move was going 
to be. They knew the force was 
aligned south in its leaguers – but 
that could mean it was headed to 
the compound complexes in Golf 
or Whiskey. Therefore, Lieutenant-
Colonel Corbould concluded, hit 
both objectives. Breach Team 1 would 
move on Golf, while Breach Team 
2 would move on Whiskey. Then, 
depending on how things went, the 
forces would proceed onto Bravo. 
 Again it took the enemy several 
hours to make any moves. ISTAR 
reports had an 82 mm mortar 
preparing to fire at coalition forces, 
while over in Objective Bravo 14 
insurgents with what looked like a 
heavy weapon were seen moving 
around but could not be engaged. 
There was no movement around Kilo.
  There was now talk that JTF-A 
or Canadian Expeditionary Force 
Command might order Operation 
Timus Preem terminated so that the 
engineers from 1 Combat Engineer 
Regiment that were in the field on 
the operation could go to Kandahar 
Air Field to participate in the ramp 
ceremony for their three dead 
comrades. There was additional talk 
that this was related to increased 
political pressure to avoid more 
casualties and that was also an 
argument to finish the operation early. 
The idea that the combat engineers 
could extract seperately from the 
operation was also floated and 
rejected. Ultimately, the operation 
RG-31’s, LAV-III’s, a Bison, and a fascine 
carrier establish themselves in the centre 
of a night leaguer. P
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continued at the behest of Brigadier-
General Dennis Thompson, who 
rejected the notion that Operation 
Timus Preem should be prematurely 
ended. 
 Breach  Team 2  had eyes-
on Objective Whiskey-2, where 
Objective Weasel was located. There 
was no pattern of life. The breach was 
launched. To get at Weasel, the breach 
team had to traverse complex terrain. 
The Badger AEV went first. Its blade, 
ploughed through a marijuana field, 
took down a hardened five-foot high 
mud wall, and cut a path through a 
square corn field, then took down 
the next wall, which was nearly eight 
feet high. This put the AEV into a 
second square walled field, where 
the process was repeated. When 
the last wall was down, the AEV 
was in sight of Objective Whiskey. 
This route was selected because the 
ground was relatively flat. The walled 
fields to the east were full of grape 
growing trenches, and the west there 
was a wooded stream with a wall 
paralleling it. 
 The Leopard 2 troop followed 
the AEV, burst out of the last breach, 
and moved in open ground to isolate 
Objective Whiskey. The Leopard 
C-2 with the dozer followed and 
ploughed out the “herring bone” 
run-ups in the first field, which was 
occupied by the battalion tactical air 
controller.The tank then moved to the 
second field and did the same for the 
infantry LAV-IIIs
 By 0837 hours, Objective Whiskey 
was isolated by the cut-off forces 
and the exploitation started. Major 
Dave Proctor’s OMLT, with Warrant 
Officer Chuck Côte accompanying 
the lead Afghan infantry company, 
dismounted, marched through the 
breaches, deployed, and prepared to 
move on Whiskey. A pair of AH-64s 
orbited the proceedings, looking 
for targets. In the initial search the 
Afghans and the OMLT found a large 
mortar cache and a pile of artillery 
rounds that were probably destined 
to become IEDs. A small bunker 
was found adjacent to the strike 
site and the exploitation continued. 
A report came in that the stench of 
rotting flesh was noticeable around 
the Objective Weasel strike site. 
Further explorations uncovered large 
amounts of material to make IEDs. 
Another interesting discovery made 
by the engineers was that the enemy 
was re-using Canadian construction 
materials that had been used to build 
Afghan National Police Sub Stations 
in Zharey district to shore up their 
bunkers and fighting positions. 
 Objective Kilo then started to 
take mortar fire; four rounds landed 
near the OMLT and ANA leaguer. 
These rounds bracketed the force, 
and indicated that an experienced 
or at least trained enemy mortarman 
was in play. The ANA and the OMLT 
engaged enemy spotters, while a 
quick analysis determined the firing 
point for the mortar base plate. A 
distant explosion signalled the abrupt 
end of enemy mortar team; it was 
engaged with a guided bomb unit 
from a Harrier, killing the whole 
team. ISTAR reports indicated that 
the enemy commanders kept trying 
to contact the team throughout the 
afternoon, to no avail.
 Breach Team 1 followed Breach 
Team 2 through its breach, and then 
turned west south of Objective Golf. 
The Badgers and Leopard 2s swung 
north to isolate Golf from the west, 
while keeping an eye on Bravo to 
the south. The shortage of Afghans 
meant that the Canadian infantry 
platoon with Breach Team 1 and the 
Engineer Exploitation Team had their 
hands full with Golf. 
 Echelon elements carrying 
fuel, ammunition, water and food 
followed the Breach Team 2 Badger, 
which scraped out leaguer rows in a 
large open field south of Objective 
Weasel. The battalion TAC and the 
echelon moved into these positions. 
Around 1625 hours, the enemy was 
able to get off a round or two of either 
mortar or rocket-propelled grenade 
airburst which exploded near the 
battalion TAC just as the Leopard 2 
Armoured Recovery Vehicle nick-
named “Calgary” hooked up a 
Leopard 2 that was having power 
pack problems. The turret crews 
could see spotting pop ups along 
walls, but they could not tell if they 
were enemy spotters or curious 
children, or both. Then an orbiting 
MQ-1 spotted a pair of men with 
binoculars observing the leaguers 
and started to track them. 
 Major Chris Adams observed six 
insurgents in a nearby compound, 
while the JTAC spotted two more 
carrying what looked like a heavy 
weapon, possibly an 82 mm recoil-
less rifle. The orbiting Predator was 
cleared to engage. At the same time, 
the Afghans engaged a target with 
small arms fire, and then a Leopard 2 
fired a 120 mm cannister round at 
a group of insurgents who were 
probing the leaguer positions. 
 Almost all Canadian groups in all 
of the objective areas reported people 
equipped with binoculars observing 
the new positions. Orders were given 
to engage anyone involved in this 
activity. An unknown vehicle crew 
commander whispered onto the 
net: “I seeeee you!” right before his 
gunner fired. A total of three enemy 
spotter teams were taken out using 
25 mm and 120 mm fire. 
 Objective Whiskey was now 100 
percent clear. Additional searches 
uncovered mortar, rocket-propelled 
grenade and IED material caches (the 
mortar rounds had Chinese markings 
on them). A number of radios were 
found, plus some cell phones and 
a significant quantity of medical 
supplies. A detainee was taken and 
whisked away to Kandahar Air Filed 
via UH-60 helicopter. Objective Golf, 
however, was not cleared yet, so there 
was no update on material found. At 
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1645 hours, the enemy ineffectively 
engaged the leaguer with rocket-
propelled grenade and small arms 
fire from the west. 
 Information from Afghan sources 
indicated that the enemy had moved 
back in on the initial breach routes 
from Summit to Objective Mike 
and laid eight IEDs on them. They 
also determined that 15 wounded 
enemy fighters were evacuated to one 
field hospital, and eight to another. 
For the most part, the bulk of the 
insurgents in the objectives areas 
retreated west, south west, and south 
to get out of the way of the armoured 
onslaught. The results of the airstrike 
on Objective Weasel were in some 
dispute. The numbers of enemy 
killed were revised down. The best 
estimate at this point was 25 killed, 15 
wounded, including a small number 
of Arabs, Pakistanis, and possibly 
Chechyns. Further information came 
in that the enemy had 15 fighters 
placing mines on routes south of 
the leaguer, trying to anticipate the 
force’s movement. Again, reports of 
more inbound mortar teams came in. 
The Badger AEVs were tasked to dig 
shell scrapes throughout the leaguer. 
The engineers used plastic explosives 
to take down large Ironwood trees 
that blocked the tanks’ arcs of fire. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould 
assessed the situation. The enemy 
was reacting in a more coordinated 
fashion than the day before, but 
still not strongly. The options were 
to move onto Bravo, continue to 
“muck out” Golf, both, or withdraw. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould was 
also prepared to use the leaguer as a 
“hedgehog” and rack up the kills – if 
the enemy chose to take it on. The 
enemy, on the other hand, seemed 
to be slowly reinforcing the area near 
Objective Bravo with small groups. 
Small groups of young men on 
motorcycles were also seen entering 
the now-abandoned Objective Mike; 
there was word that the two enemy 
commanders for western Zharey 
were on the scene. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould 
decided to clear Objective Bravo. The 
night leaguer was oriented south, 
while Objective Bravo was to the 
west. It was probable that the enemy 
would think the axis of advance 
would be south and not west, so 
some surprise might be achieved. 
The move on Bravo would also 
avoid the mines the enemy placed 
to the south. Both breach teams 
would isolate the rather elongated 
Bravo objective area, then the ANA 
and OMLT would clear south to 
north to throw off anybody still in 
their positions. The only issue was a 
pair of small wadis, but the fascines 
would be put to good use there. The 
Canadian and Afghan forces pulled 
into their night leaguers, dismounted 
and made supper. As the night 
closed in the PSYOPS teams played 
Blue Oyster Cult’s “Don’t Fear the 
Reaper,” followed by a succession of 
distorted tunes from Blink-182, Limp 
Bizkit, and Linkin Park. There was no 
contact that night. 
Day 3 – 23 August
At 0630 hours, observers saw a group of women and children 
leaving Objective Bravo and heading 
north. An enemy observer with a 
cell phone was seen in the midst 
of the women and children, so the 
Leopard 2 tank crew that was tracking 
him refrained from firing its 120 mm 
gun. Another group of insurgents 
were, however, seen to be signalling 
their compatriots, and they had no 
human shield, so a 120 mm HEAT 
round took them out. 
 At 0655 hours the Badger AEVs 
with their fascines moved out of the 
leaguer, heading west southwest. 
The two wadis were filled in with 
the fascines and crossing points 
At dusk a Leopard 2 tracks suspected spotters from the night leaguer. After the sun 
went down, this vehicle engaged and destroyed an enemy anti-tank team.
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established for the follow-on forces. 
A motorcycle was seen to leave 
Bravo heading west at high speed. 
This was probably a “Paul Revere,” 
a backup early warning fighter 
headed off to alert his commanders 
that the coalition forces were not 
moving as anticipated. Indeed, crew 
commanders and gunners started 
to see signalling mirrors blinking 
in the morning light. Lieutenant-
Colonel Corbould was informed 
through ISTAR reports that the 
enemy was having serious problems 
communicating with their early 
warning networks, particularly after 
they had been targeted. 
 Breach Teams 1 and 2 ploughed 
on through the rich soil of the tall 
cornfields. The Badgers put in the 
“ring road” and by 0725 hours the 
Leopard 2s and LAV-IIIs had isolated 
Objective Bravo. The Afghans and the 
OMLT commenced their sweep in the 
south. Many fighting age males were 
seen but it was difficult to determine 
whether they were “moving with 
intent” or if they were conducting 
“agriculturally-related activities.” 
A CIMIC team working with the 
Afghan soldiers conducted a Key 
Leadership Engagement in one of 
the Bravo compounds, as engineers 
found a locked trap door elsewhere. 
The local nationals told the Afghan 
soldiers that the insurgents rounded 
up everybody in the area and put 
them under guard in a grape hut, and 
told them not to leave or look out. 
The enemy did not want them telling 
coalition forces what direction they 
went in. The engineers then found 
IED equipment, while an orbiting 
UAV saw a man on a motorcycle 
headed west stopping and talking to 
small groups of fighting age males 
that were conducing “agriculturally-
related activities.” Nobody seemed 
to be in a hurry to go anywhere near 
Bravo. 
 The local population in Bravo, it 
turned out, was extremely friendly. 
Almost 60 people remained in their 
compounds when the sweep forces 
came through and they were quite 
helpful in describing enemy activity in 
their area. The people were adamant 
that most of the enemy they saw 
were Pakistanis from Balochistan, 
with some Arabs and, apparently, 
Chechyns. They forced local people 
to store vehicles, but did not force 
them to store weapons. For the most 
part, the insurgents stayed overnight 
in the fields, not in the compounds. 
They operated in groups no larger 
than eight, and usually carried a mix 
of small arms and rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers. Special two- and 
four-man teams carried the 82 mm 
recoilless rifles. Local nationals with 
military background told the ANA 
soldiers that the Taliban were low 
on ammunition this season and were 
probably incapable of sustained 
actions as they had been in 2006. 
 The CIMIC team decided to hold 
a formal shura. In that meeting they 
learned that the people in Bravo were 
mostly pro-government, so much so 
that the Taliban hung a kidnapped 
police officer from a tree earlier in 
the year to intimidate the people. 
More importantly, a local national 
with military experience confirmed 
that Objective Weasel was in fact 
some form of forward headquarters 
and depot. The enemy commanders 
apparently had two command 
“nodes” and rotated them through 
Weasel so both would not be killed at 
once – Bravo was a transit area for the 
backup command node. The enemy 
kept a small command team active in 
Weasel at all times and augmented 
when necessary from Bravo. If an 
operation was undertaken east in 
Sanjeray, the teams generally passed 
through Weasel on the way. 
 The insurgents interfered with 
education in the Bravo area. There 
was a school and a principal and the 
ANP had a checkpoint to protect it. 
The Taliban kidnapped and killed the 
police and threatened the principal. 
He was forced to hide the small 
school library to prevent it from 
being burned. The PSYOPS team 
was concerned that the enemy would 
portray the withdrawal as a victory 
to the population. Discussions with 
local people confirmed that they 
understood that the coalition forces 
could not stay indefinitely and would 
be resistant to the Taliban’s claims of 
victory. They had seen the Taliban 
driven away by the coalition forces 
and knew they would be back by 
nightfall. 
 Continued sweeps in Bravo 
turned up very little. There was 
confirmatory information from 
other local nationals. By 1100 hours, 
L ieutenant-Colonel  Corbould 
decided to extract the force and 
head back to FOB Mas’um Ghar. The 
extraction plan was tricky. The enemy 
was alerted and no doubt would 
mine and IED the existing west-east 
routes between Bravo and Route 
Summit if they could. The enemy 
could not be sure, however, that the 
Operation Timus Preem force might 
not continue to move south or west, 
and they did not have an unlimited 
number of devices. Lieutenant-
Colonel Corbould decided to take the 
most direct option. The two breach 
teams would plough two parallel 
routes along the single west-east 
road, and have the forces in Objective 
Echo clear the junction of that road 
and Summit and from Summit to 
FOB Mas’um Ghar so there were no 
surprises on the way home. Alertness 
was a priority. It was a long and hot 
operation, and thoughts of a shower 
and hot food could not be allowed to 
override vigilance. 
 Breach Team 1 headed south, 
while a Badger from Breach Team 
2 ploughed a track and a “parking 
lot” pointing west while the forces 
assembled in lanes pointing west. 
ISTAR reports indicated there was 
enemy observation and they were 
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trying to figure out where to set up 
an ambush. Once Breach Team 1 was 
well on its way, Breach Team 2 peeled 
back and headed south too.
 By 1350 hours, the lead Badger 
AEV in Breach Team 1 started to 
overheat as it tried to traverse a 
muddied wadi system and mechanics 
were brought up to repair it. Another 
Badger was pushed forward to 
maintain the momentum. A Scan 
Eagle MUAV flew ahead along the 
planned routes to check the tree 
lines for possible enemy ambushes. 
Nothing so far.
 At 1407 hours a Leopard 2 crew 
spotted several insurgents in tall 
grass south of the breaches. There 
was some debate as to who was going 
to engage, artillery, Predator, or the 
tanks. The enemy dispersed and 
withdrew as the tanks readied their 
coaxial machine guns. Then Major 
Adams spotted three more insurgents 
manoeuvring to the south-and let fly 
with a 120 mm canister round, killing 
all three. The orbiting Predator re-
acquired the first group, which was 
in the process of splitting into two 
teams. It was not clear whether they 
were running away or manoeuvring.
 Breach Team 2, however, hit a 
wet wadi system and then ploughed 
into a wet cornfield. The Badgers and 
Leopards had to back up and find a 
route around this impasse. Could the 
vehicles now start using the road to 
speed things up? There was only 200 
metres of it left before it hit the paved 
Route Summit. The answer was no: 
continue to avoid the road in case of 
IEDs. Major Adams, quoting the film 
“Back to the Future,” said over the 
radio: “Roads? Where we’re going 
we don’t NEED roads!” It was just as 
well. When Breach Team 2 was forced 
closer to the road because of wet 
terrain, a sweep discovered an IED; it 
was blown in place by the engineers. 
The breach team swung north again 
into navigable terrain and continued 
east. 
 By this time, Canadian and 
Afghan forces cleared and secured 
the junction as the Badgers and 
Leopards bashed through the rich 
earth of the fields. As soon as the 
vehicles hit the junction, they headed 
south to FOB Mas’um Ghar. There 
were no incidents in the extraction. 
Operation Timus Preem was over, 
with no Canadian casualties.
Conclusions
Operation Timus Preem had a number of effects on the enemy 
in Zharey district. First, it forced 
them to re-organize their command 
structure and replace leaders. Second, 
it wiped out their “forward” IED 
production capacity and transit base 
to the Sangeray area. The cumulative 
effects contributed to the lack of IED 
activity directed at the Operation Asp-
e-Janoubi turbine transit operation 
that took place days afterwards.9 The 
operation also most likely took out 
some of the people involved in killing 
the three Canadian engineers on the 
eve of the operation. The operation 
also bought time for Stability Box 
Juno to consolidate. There may have 
been longer term effects but they 
were not measureable in August 
2008. By spring 2009, Construction 
Management Team-2 was working 
with local Afghans to address volatile 
water diversion and irrigation issues 
in the “box” – without noticeable or 
significant enemy interference. 
 O p e r a t i o n  T i m u s  P r e e m , 
however, continued to highlight the 
problem of not being able to install 
an enduring Afghan government 
security and governance presence 
in an area subjected to a clearance 
operation. The enemy forces were 
swept from the area, many were 
killed and wounded, but without 
adequate security in place they 
returned the night after the Mechs left 
for home. It was noted by all involved 
in the operation, and understood 
beforehand, that the populations 
in some of the objective areas were 
either pro-government or potentially 
pro-government and it is a tragedy 
for the Afghans and their Canadian 
allies that adequate forces were not 
available to expand the security 
“bubble” west from Stability Box 
Juno.
Notes
1. The Canadian Leopard 2s serving in 
Afghanistan now have the capability to 
mount such implements.
2. Sean M. Maloney, “Incursion at Howz-e 
Madad: An Afghanistan Vignette,” 
Canadian Military History 17 no. 1 (Winter 
2008), pp.
3. FIBUA: Fighting in Built Up Areas. 
Facetiously called FART or Fighting 
Around Town or FISH, Fighting in 
Somebody’s House by UK forces.
4. Sean M. Maoney, “Panjwayi Alamo: 
The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan,” 
Canadian Military History  18 no. 3 
(Summer 2009), pp.
5. The author observed the planning 
process for Operation Timus Preem and 
accompanied the battlegroup for the 
duration of the operation in the field.
6. aka ‘Jabba the Hut.’
7. As in, “The Rocket Man.”
8. These were Sergeant Shawn Eades, 
Corporal Dustin Wasden, and Sapper 
Stephan Stock, all from 1 Combat 
Engineer Regiment.
9. The enemy’s ”rear” or depth IED 
production facilities were taken out the 
night after Op Timus Preem by special 
operations forces. I was told that it was 
the most successful SOF strike against 
Zharey IED cells in two years. This also 
contributed to the success of Op ASP-E-
JANOUBI.
Dr. Sean M. Maloney is the historical 
advisor to the Chief of the Land Staff. 
He has travelled annually to Afghanistan 
since 2003 to observe coalition operations. 
He is the author of several books 
including Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue 
Historian in Afghanistan (Potomac Books, 
2005) and Confronting the Chaos: A Rogue 
Historian Returns to Afghanistan (Naval 
Institute Press, 2009). The third book 
in the series, Fighting for Afghanistan: A 
Rogue Historian at War will come out early 
next year from Naval Institute Press.
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